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BOSTON PHRENOLOGICAL SOCIETY,

December 28th, 1835.

BY S. G. HOWE.

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ADDRESS.

Gentlemen of the Phrenological Society,—

The occasion which calls you together this day, is an interesting and pleasing, yet most melancholy one. You have assembled to commemorate two events, which are of great interest, and I trust, will be of great import to man,—the anniversary of the birth of Spurzheim—and of the formation of your Society.

But you cannot so control your feelings, as to fix them upon these pleasing events, and prevent them from hurrying forward to anticipate a sad one: you cannot rejoice in recollection of the birth of your great teacher, without sighing, too, at the thought of his early and lamented end. Nor should you wish to control such feelings—they are the natural tribute of kind hearts to departed worth; they will be more grateful to the spirit, which, I am sure, is hovering near us, than the pompous eulogy, or the storied urn.

You all loved Spurzheim—you all mourned for him—you all reverence his memory; and, although your science teaches you to beware of pinning your faith on human authority—of becoming man worshippers—you may safely add your part to the meed of admiration, which is beginning to be paid him, in every civilized country. In Germany, in Denmark, in France, and in England, the number of those who have

embraced his doctrines is rapidly increasing. His views of the physiological and moral nature of man, have been closely examined by some of the ablest physiologists and moralists of the age, and have come out bright, and clear from the ordeal. Within the past year, professors, who had grown gray in teaching, have come forward, and confessed that they never had satisfactory views of the philosophy of man, until they derived them from this simple student of nature.

If, then, others who knew him but as an author and philosopher, pay to him the homage of admiration, what is due from us, who knew him as a man—as a friend—almost as a brother? Who of us can recall his manly, but gentle bearing—his benignant countenance, ever changing in intellectual expression, but every expression stamped with the impress of benevolence—his child-like simplicity of manner—his quaint, but shrewd and philosophic remarks—who, in a word, can recall to mind, Spurzheim, as he walked, and talked, and smiled among us, but two years ago,—and refuse the tribute of a tear to one of the kindest and best of men, if not one of the wisest and greatest of philosophers?

He came among us a stranger, with no other passport to our confidence than his personal merit, and with no other introduction than his reputation as an able but visionary enthusiast: he abode but a few short weeks with us, and departed from among us,—what? Let the voluntary public demonstrations of respect,—let the general and sincere sorrow of the community,—let the tears of the many converts he had made,—let your own sad hearts, Phrenologists, give an answer to the sad question.

But can it be that Spurzheim has really departed from among us? No! his spirit is here—it is walking abroad in the community—it has drawn you together this evening—it is animating and encouraging your labors as a Society—his bright and pure example is as a burning and shining light, leading you on, in the pathway to truth. Long may it burn—long may your Society exist to follow it: and if it exist,

until the doctrines taught by him are confuted, it will never be numbered among the things that were, and are not.

It is not my intention, however, to eulogize Spurzheim; the task has been performed by far abler hands; but I could not come before you on this occasion, without adapting my first words to what I knew must be your first sad thought: for, as long as any of your number, who knew him personally, shall remain to join in your annual celebration, so long will the memory of him, to whom the Society owes its existence, throw a shade of melancholy on the occasion. But I trust—nay, I am confident, that every returning year will bring with it increasing testimony to the merit of Spurzheim, through the increasing prevalence of his doctrines.

The evidence of the very last year has done much toward this; and allow me to congratulate you, Gentlemen, upon the rapid and extraordinary advance, which the science has made.

To say nothing of Great Britain, where highly respectable societies have long been formed in London, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dublin, Hull, Bristol, and other places,—there are others springing up on the continent. In France, the doctrines of Phrenology have been embraced and professed by many of the most scientific men—such as Andral, Broussais, Fosati; and Denmark and Germany, and Italy, have furnished able and efficient propagators of the truths of the science.

I say, then, that I congratulate you, Gentlemen, not because you will indulge in the disposition to triumph and boast; but because I know you regard the prevalence of the great moral doctrines of your science, as conducive to the good of society. It is too much the fashion with associations, whose purposes are the purest and best, to appeal to feelings of mere animal, or certainly ignoble nature: they talk of their opponents as of hostile beings; they call almost exclusively upon the combativeness, and self-esteem, and love of approbation of their associates; and some, even in their prayers to the God of Benevolence, invoke him to rise and

exterminate his enemies, and their enemies! But Phrenologists should not indulge in these feelings; the first principles of the science teaches that men cannot be naturally, knowingly, and wilfully enemies of the truth and of good. There is in human nature, that which makes it aspire ever after better and better things—ever after clearer and clearer views of truth;—and if men *seem* wilfully blind and stubborn, and oppose the truth, it is because some of the faculties, which were intended for but moderate influence, have been unduly cultivated and developed.

Let the word enemy, then, be banished from the vocabulary of the Phrenologist; we *have no enemies*, for surely our science teaches us to believe that truth is pleasing and desirable to man, and the truths of Phrenology have need only to be open to all, in order to be embraced by all.

Again—in reviewing the progress of our science, have we not reason to doubt the wisdom of many of the measures adopted by its friends, and to condemn the sensitiveness of many of its advocates?

It has always appeared to me, that Phrenologists are wrong in complaining so bitterly of the mode in which their science has been treated by its opponents. How they have writhed under the scorpion whip of ridicule—how they have raved about the misrepresentations of their adversaries! For instance, what howls were issued in England against the Edinburgh Review—and more lately, in our land, against the Christian Examiner: mention either of these names, and the eyes of the Phrenologist flash fire—his ideality has made out of the meek but wily authors, savage monsters, whom his destructiveness longs to exterminate. He writhes at the very recollection of these encounters; not because he was there vanquished—not because he even received a serious wound; but because the spectators thought so: his self-esteem was uninjured, but his love of approbation suffered.

Now, if viewed dispassionately, it seems to me, that the very manner in which the science has been treated, is one

of the best proofs of its value; the scorn and contempt which met the announcement of its birth; the jibes and jokes upon its supposed early decease; the kicks and cuffs, the bantling received, as it grew up in childhood; the serious blows, the deadly threats aimed at it when arrived at lusty youth; and the musterings of forces, the scouring of arms, which are now visible among its opponents, indicate that they view it as a formidable enemy.

The fundamental principles of our science should teach us that such treatment is natural: if the truths of Phrenology had been embraced by the learned, as soon as announced, what would have become of the self-esteem of the doctors; if all old notions had been abandoned at once, where would have been adhesiveness, which should have held fast to them; if the science had not been ridiculed and jeered at, where would have been the mirth of its adversaries; if it had not been attacked with deadly intent, and murderous weapons of misrepresentation and calumny, where would have been the destructiveness of the *antis*.

When our science furnishes such a beautiful and consistent explanation of the conduct of its opponents, it is unwise, uncharitable, in other words, unphrenological, to attribute to them such motives as have been attributed in various phrenological writings.

There is no more of prejudice, no more of hostility, no more of unfairness towards Phrenology, than might have been predicated from its first principles. There are many wise men, and good men, who consider the phrenological doctrines as unsound, and dangerous; and, although we think their error arises from prejudice, or from ignorance of the principles of our science, although we are confident they are wrong, and we are right, it would be unphilosophical to feel absolutely certain of it, and it would be unwise to affirm it.

If Phrenologists have a right to complain of any thing, it is, that the doctrines of their science are embraced, pro-

fessed, and practised by those who never examine its philosophy; who will not penetrate its principles; who merely skim over the surface of the head, but go not beneath the scalp.

People will not approach the subject of Phrenology, as they do every other science, by a study of its principles; they begin at the surface, and are consequently startled by the first apparent objection. They do not take Phrenology by the horns—they take it by the bumps.

The tyro, who has read a few pages of Spurzheim, and Combe, and studied upon a cast, seeks the first opportunity of examining a friend's head, finds a large development of destructiveness, for instance, and at once pronounces him blood-thirsty; if he happens to be so, he is confirmed in his faith, and so is the subject; but if he is decidedly a quiet lamb-like man, our tyro is discouraged himself, and laughed at by others; neither he, nor they, stop to inquire whether the destructiveness is restrained by a great degree of conscientiousness, cautiousness, or other modifying circumstances.

Phrenology has no worse enemies than those sophomores and blue stockings, who run about applying their callipers, or their fingers to their neighbors' heads, and pronouncing upon their dispositions; a few successful hits give them an authority in the little social orbits, where they shine as stars of great magnitude; their friends begin to examine Phrenology—the blue swells into importance—her decisions are pronounced in an oracular manner; she becomes a sort of prophetess, and at every party, heads bow before her, until she pronounces some mooncalf to be a genius, some coward to be a hero, or some poet to be a dolt,—when, without ado, the pythoness is scouted, her tripod is overset, and, unable to recover from her defeat, or to explain its cause, she is laughed at: Phrenology shares in the ridicule, and can never be mentioned without bringing up the recollections of her discomfiture.

The power of ascertaining character by physical development, (I say, physical, because craniological development

alone is not enough,) is the application of *all* the principles of Phrenology—and Phrenology is but a mean to this end. How absurd, then, the procedure of those who begin with the end, and who, not content to serve an apprenticeship, go at once to the application of principles they never studied. It is like wishing to take the instruments of an astronomer, and measure the orbit of a planet, without a profound study of mathematics.

The size of the brain, indeed, the relative proportion of its different parts, and the greater or less development of its particular organs, do determine, in a great measure, the mental manifestations which are made through them; and as they give form to the cranium, the latter is an important criterion in the judgment of character—which is made up, of course, of mental manifestation: but they are by no manner of means the sole criteria—nor can any confidence be placed in the phrenological decisions of those tyros who judge by them alone. A large man is not necessarily a strong man, nor a large brain, or a large organ, necessarily an active or strong one; nay, the brain may be beautifully formed, particular organs may predominate, and yet the character, or the sum of the manifestations made through them, may be altogether different from what it would be, in the opinion of him who judged by measurement of the cranium alone. Man is curiously and wonderfully made; there is a mysterious yet evident connection between all the parts of the system; and an idiosyncrosy, or a disease of the serous, the arterial, the lymphatic, the absorbent apparatus may modify the manifestations of mind by their effect on the brain, and give a good and sufficient reason for an apparent exception to the rule, which puzzles those who judge by craniological development alone.

Indeed, so important may be, and are, these modifications, that I have sometimes regretted that a more unexceptionable name than that of Phrenology had not been given to the sci-

ence, which treats of the corporeal influences, or human organization, upon the manifestations of mind.

I have thus alluded to some of the causes which oppose the progress of Phrenology: I might go on and point out many others, but this is hardly the proper occasion; nor will you expect from your speaker any fresh arguments in favor of your science, or any additional light upon its doctrines; if so, you would have selected another to address you. All that I shall attempt, then, will be some general reflections, which may, or not, be new; for I am not deeply enough read in the science to determine that.

And, first, it seems altogether idle to talk, as many do, about the theory of Phrenology, and to regard it as a subject on which much may be said *pro* and *con;* for there is no theory about it,—it is altogether a question of fact. If false, its falsity is demonstrable; if true, it should be ranked as a branch of natural history, and studied accordingly. It pretends that the mind operates through the agency of the brain alone, and that, according to the quantity and quality of this brain, will be the quantity and quality of mental manifestations, *cæteris paribus.*

But it does not stand uncommitted upon this broad ground; it takes a narrower position, and asserts, that if the measurement of the brain falls below a certain standard, the person must be idiotic. Now, if this is not true, its falsity is demonstrable: there are, in every generation, eight hundred millions of human beings upon the earth, and they have every variety of form and size of the head, within a certain range; find then among these, one, only one single cranium, upon the shoulders of a reasonable being, which falls below this range, and Phrenology is vanquished—exploded forever.

Again, Phrenology asserts that certain mental manifestations are made through certain parts of the brain, and *through them only.* Now, although many causes may exist for the *non*-operation of the faculties where the cerebral development does exist, yet the contrary is not true; and if a single

case can be found, where the faculties operate strongly without any corresponding development, there again Phrenology is at fault. Thus, then, Phrenology differs from any other system of moral philosophy brought forward, that there is no crevice or loop-hole by which it may escape when hedged in; that it is demonstrably false, if its premises are really without foundation in nature.

How different from all former systems which stood only until some more ingenious and plausible one was brought forward and contrasted with them: they asserted nothing, they had nothing to defend, and the Academic, the Peripatetic, the Cynic, the Stoic, each felt secure in his own airy nothingness; and in later times the Nominalists, the Realists, the Verbalists, the Formalists, and a score of other sects, have existed, and disputed, because they stood upon no tangible ground. You might as well lunge at a shadow, as argue with a moralist or metaphysician of the old school, for he had no entity; or, if he took a position, and you attacked him in it with logical argument, he would raise the dust of a syllogism so thickly around him, that you could not tell who was the victor.

Almost in our own age, we have seen scores of systems set up and quarelled about with much wordy war: if we examine and compare them, we find their merit depended upon the ingenuity of their supporters, not upon their intrinsic worth; and it required all the gigantic powers of Brown to show their inconsistency with themselves. But even Brown built up nothing better than what he overthrew, simply because he neglected organization: he overlooked the immense influence which the physical has upon the intellectual man. Like most other metaphysicians, he judged others by what passed within himself: they all hold up consciousness as a mirror before them, and think they see there an image of man which they attempt to describe; but alas! the mirror is so narrow it will admit but one image at a time, and that the

image of him who holds it up. It must ever be, that, while men judge the mental emotions, dispositions, and characters of others by the consciousness of what passes within themselves, they must ever err.

Again, to notice another popular error: Phrenology is generally considered a *new* thing, as one that is received and credited by but very few; whereas, its general principles were known and admitted from the earliest periods of science, and are now admitted by thousands, who would be surprised if told they were Phrenologists.

From the days of Aristotle down to our own, many anatomists and physiologists have supposed the brain to be the seat of the different mental faculties: it would be a waste of words, to quote proofs of this fact: it would be an equal waste of time, to refer to the considerations which have led you to embrace the first principle of your science, which is, that the brain is the indispensable organ of mental manifestations, and to draw the inevitable inference from it, that the nature and force of the manifestations must be dependent on the state of the organ. The proofs of this latter truth are too obvious to need repetition; they occur in every one about us, and in ourselves; it is as certain that inflammation of the brain, or a cold in the head, affects mental manifestations, as it is that inflammation of the organ of sight affects the vision.

Equally certain is it, that any mechanical pressure upon the brain disturbs all the mental manifestations; that a greater degree renders the subject an idiot, as long as the pressure lasts; so that an ounce or two of water, on the brain of a Napoleon or a Bacon, would make them imbecile, without disturbing their vegetative life.

The only wonder is, that this fundamental principle of Phrenology, being so generally known and admitted, was entirely overlooked by those who framed the various systems of moral and mental philosophy, until the days of Gall and Spurzheim; and hence it is, that all the theories of mind

have been so very vague and unsatisfactory: they are what theories of vision would have been, if formed without any regard to the structure of the organ of sight.

Every body admits a plurality of motives—the very school-boy states one of the first principles of Phrenology, when he says, "I want to, but dare not;" and every hour of every day, we feel the contention of opposing wills: it is in vain to seek refuge in the supposition, that the stronger will conquers and swallows up all the minor ones—for though it does conquer, it does not exterminate: the weaker will is under indeed, but still struggling, and it may, in a moment, overthrow its opponent. Who has not experienced, again and again, that in common parlance, "his passions had obtained entire mastery over himself"—that he felt and acted, as, in his cooler moments, worlds would not have tempted him to act? And how does he explain it? Why, he says, "that he was beside himself," that reason was overpowered; or, in other words, the will to act according to certain principles of action, was for an instant overpowered by the will, to act on certain other principles; for in the very storm and whirlwind of his passion, he heard, but heeded not, the still small voice of conscientiousness.

The plurality of motives, or wills, is then universally admitted; for we find a tacit acknowledgment of it, in the very formation of languages, and, as Shakspeare, has it, we feel "our bodies are our gardens, to which our wills are gardeners." What a theme is here for a homily—what a text is here, to head a discourse on morality and education;—"our bodies are gardens, to which our wills are gardeners;" truly, Will Shakspeare was a Phrenologist, and he half confessed it, when he said, "the pure brain, which some suppose the soul's frail dwelling-house."

But to return. We have seen that most physiologists, indeed, most reflecting men, now admit, that the brain is the organ of mind—that without the brain, there can be no mental

manifestation; in other words, the will works by means of the brain: they grant, then, the first principle of Phrenology; but Phrenologists, *par excellence*, go farther, and let us see, why all men go not with them: if they admit that the will, or predominant will, acts through the brain, why do not the various wills act through the various parts of it?

The operations of the mind or the mental faculties, being not only of various, but entirely opposite character, the inference would be perfectly fair and logical, that they were thus carried on by means of different parts of the brain; and Phrenologists might base this second fundamental principle of their science upon the analogy of nature, which shows that every where separate functions are performed by separate organs. The cognizance of the shape of a stone, for instance, is carried to the sensorium, by one set of nerves, and the command from the sensorium to the muscles of the hand to lift that stone, by another set of nerves; and yet the difference between these two processes, is not so great as between the desire to worship, and the desire to eat. Hundreds of similar instances might be given. But Phrenologists rest not the principle of the plurality of the organs upon analogy; they ask why, if the brain is not a compound organ, do not all the faculties manifest themselves at the same period of life; why a man may be insane on one topic, and not on another; why a rich man, who has no desire to accumulate, may be irresistibly impelled to steal, even from his own wife and children; why one, otherwise dull boy, at the age of ten years, will have a greater musical or mathematical knowledge, than an intelligent youth, who has spent twice ten years in the vain strife to acquire it; why one man is a poet, in spite of every other effort of others to prevent it, and another can never string two verses together with all the aid of education; and, finally, why a wound upon one part of the head will deprive a man of all knowledge of the names of things, for example, leaving all his other fac-

ulties entire and unaffected? Now there can be no rational answer to any of these queries, but the supposition of a plurality of organs.

The second principle of Phrenology is, then, firmly established; but to make assurance doubly sure, Phrenologists point to thousands, I may say, tens of thousands of skulls, casts or drawings of remarkable individuals, and make us observe that, in every case, a particular physical development accompanies the different mental or moral dispositions; and they boldly assert, that the whole world over, not an exception to the rule can be found, unless there be some restraining or modifying cause.

I know of nothing more interesting, or, to one who is unprepared for such an exhibition, more startling, than the array of skulls and casts, in the great Phrenological Golgotha of London and Paris: first, you see hundreds of mean, flat skulls, with the top as narrow, and the crowns as low, as those of monkeys or dogs; they are the skulls of idiots; they are ranged side by side, in long rows—and a glance tells you there were never brains enough in them to elevate their wearers above the brutes: then there are others, with the back parts of the head very large, but the front, villanously low—these were gluttons, or sensualists, robbers, pirates, or murderers; they are ranged rank upon rank, by scores, and by hundreds: others have the head better proportioned, but the upper region is narrow or flat, and the part above the eye-brows projecting, and well developed; these are the knowing ones, the shrewd, cunning, cautious, cheats or swindlers—of these are multitudes: other ranks, more thinly filled, show you the lofty top, the bulging front, the spacious breadth, which mark the heads of philosophers, the moralists, the men who are a law unto themselves.

Now all these different groups seem still to talk in their natural language, even after death; and so strong is the association with shape, that the dry skull bones, or the colorless plaster still preserve it; and you see the stupid idiotic stare,

or the grovelling animal gaze, or the keen cunning look, or the lofty dignified glance, as you regard the skull of the idiot—the sensualist—the rogue—or the philosopher.

Here, at this last mustering, there is no disguise—it is the unrobing of players after the play—the drama of life is closed—the actors have laid aside their mask, secretiveness has forgot its cunning, and hypocrisy has dropped his cloak. Here the Phrenologist is in his element: no refinement of education, no polish of manner, no disguise of dress can now embarrass him; for hat and wig, and scalp are gone, and, with a knowledge of the temperament of each individual, he will assign him his place according to the part he was best fitted to play, better than any stage manager could have done in life.

But to return from this digression. I have stated the two leading principles of Phrenology; and thus far I believe the great majority of the world go with Phrenologists; it is rare to find a man who will deny that the brain is the organ of mental manifestations; and almost every one whom you can get to think at all on the subject, will say—"Well, I grant that the great outlines are true, that one part is the region of intellect, and another of feeling,—but as for your minute partitions—your mapping out of the head—it is all humbug." But here you have him on the hip, for the very moment he conceded the outlines, he conceded the whole—he grants he can see continents and great islands, and where these exist, there must be coasts, and capes, and isthmuses—there must be counties, towns, villages, aye! and parishes too, whether he see them or not.

You, gentlemen, have studied this map: what seemed at first a confused surface, is beautifully and systematically divided. Let him study this, and it will seem to him the same: he will grant the numerous great principles, as easily as he did the first: he will see, that there being a plurality of organs, the analogy of all nature shows they must act more or less powerfully according to their size, other things being

equal; he will see that the most extended observation of men confirms this analogy. He will then ask himself, whether these distinct organs are cognizable during life; and, taking into consideration the influence of temperament and education, he will begin to apply his principles. Such a convert is worth the having; such a man will go forth into the field of inquiry properly equipped for service; he will not be dismayed by the apparent confusion, for he will consider that the number of the combinations of the faculties is almost infinite; he will not be discouraged by the first apparent contradiction, nor turned back by the first unmanageable bump he may meet.

A knowledge of physiology, of human and comparative anatomy, and of *educability* in its widest sense, are requisite to form a Phrenologist; and although a person, who has the power of perceiving the varieties and relations of form, and comparison enough to judge of the connection of the organs with each other, may often pronounce very correctly upon character from the form of the head alone, he is not to be depended upon, or considered a Phrenologist. I have often been amazed by crude notions, which even well informed men have of Phrenology; I have been asked to point out their principal craniological developments, or to teach them how to judge them in others, and when I answered that I could do no such thing, they cry, "Why? I thought you were a Phrenologist!" I would indeed that I were. I have spent some time in the study—but I only, as yet, seem to see the temple of truth in the distance. If I could hope, by years of patient study, to penetrate into the *sanctum*, I should deem the price paid for admission as a trifle in comparison to the rich reward which awaits those who reach it. I think the little knowledge I have of the science, has already been of considerable advantage to me. I think I know my own character better than I did before; I know I have been enabled to apply some new ideas in the direction of others to a very great advantage.

One source of great satisfaction to the inquiring mind is, the easy and beautiful solution of difficulties which were unexplained by all other systems of moral philosophy; and to me it seems, that, if but one single organ of the faculties had been located satisfactorily, still the philosophy of Phrenology would be of immense importance to science.

I remember being forcibly struck by an observation of a writer against Phrenology, to this effect—"that he had often arisen from a close study of the pages of Locke, Reid, or Brown, with the sensation that his mental powers had been taxed to the utmost, and that he had been engaged in a glorious intellectual struggle;—but that, as for this Phrenology, it was mere boy's play to the mind." Now I have found it exactly so, but my inference is entirely different from that of the writer: it does require powerful effort, and the mind is taxed and strained to the utmost to follow the metaphysical authors, and mystical psychologists through their abstruse speculations; and many an unsatisfactory headache have I had as the only reward of such effort; but Phrenology—it is clear, simple, natural: he who runs may read; and every reader may comprehend.

Its simplicity, its clearness, its universal applicability, the light it sheds upon many dark parts of the science of mind, will make it immensely valuable to the legislator and to the teacher; and most sincerely do I believe it will effect very important changes in the whole social system of man. What the discovery of the mariner's compass has been to navigators, will be the philosophy of Phrenology to education and legislation.

When it shall be admitted that man,—moral, responsible man,—is made up of a certain number of faculties, propensities, and sentiments, all and every one of which are good in themselves, good in their general tendency, and bad only when too much cultivated by exercise, or abused; when education shall be the proper training of each and all of these to their proper action; when legislation, based upon the supremacy of the moral nature of man, shall appeal less to his ani-

mal nature;—then will the philosophy of Phrenology prevail, whether legislators know the location of the organs on the cranium, or not.

To me it seems that Phrenology is the only system of moral philosophy which gives a rational explanation of the difference between the mental endowments of man and the lower animals; the only system which teaches that man does and must know and worship his Creator; and that *his* soul tendeth upward to the source whence it emanated, while the brutes go downward to the earth, and mingle forever with it; and yet, upon the back of Phrenology are packed all the sins of its predecessors, and it is obliged to bear for a time the imputation of errors which it alone disproves.

The old systems, which considered mind as a single abstract principle or power, manifesting itself in this world by the agency of a single unique organ, the brain, can make no other distinction between the mental power, or mind of man, and that of the brutes, than the difference of more or less. Where, I ask, is the difference, by the old system, between a dull man, and an intelligent dog? The answer is, the one has a soul, the other not. Aye! but what is this soul; or, what are its manifestations in the body? Is it not intelligence — reason; and has not the dog intelligence, and reason, to a certain extent? Now Phrenology explains the matter much more satisfactorily; it teaches that man is endowed, not only with intellectual faculties, which brutes have not, but with moral faculties, which make him differ from them *toto coelo.*

Phrenology divides the intellectual faculties into the perceptive and the reflecting; some of the first being possessed by animals in common with man, while the higher intellectual faculties are entirely denied them, as are also the nobler reflecting faculties. The dog sometimes astonishes us by what is called his intelligence; and the elephant puts in an irresistible claim to a participation of mind with man, as mind is defined by the old system; but Phrenology shows

that in causality and comparison they are utterly wanting. Place the most intelligent animals that ever lived beside a fire; feed that fire with fuel before their eyes for weeks in succession; and then leave them to themselves, and they will perish with cold, beside the embers which they knew not how to keep alive. Now these same animals might have been taught to know their name, to fetch and carry, and do a thousand tricks, but never to reason, never to exercise causality and comparison, because they have not the organs through which those faculties are manifested; they have the perceptive faculties, they have the lower part of the forehead, but the upper part is entirely wanting.

And is it not so with veneration, with hope, with benevolence? Phrenology leads to atheism, say its adversaries! And yet Phrenology is the only system of moral philosophy which shows *why* men worship God, and recognizes the principle of veneration as one of the innate faculties of the human mind. Many metaphysicians have assumed that the sense of the existence of a Great First Cause is not an intuitive feeling, but the result of a reasoning process.

Mr. Stewart (a great authority among the opponents of Phrenology) says—that "it requires the full exercise of our reasoning powers, to present it in all its force to the mind." How, then, will he explain the universality of worship among men, even the most savage and unenlightened? Or if it does become evident to the mind by the operation of reasoning from effect to cause, that there must be a God, a great and good God, *why* should we venerate or worship him? It is an unphilosophical conclusion, that men should worship God, *because* he is omnipotent and beneficent; it is begging the question entirely. But granting, what is by no means a natural *sequitur*, that enlightened men are led to worship a Being whom they conceive to be omnipotent and omniscient, and only half the difficulty is explained; for the ignorant and barbarous have no such conception of God, and some even worship what they call the devil.

Now how does Phrenology explain this? It looks abroad

upon all mankind, and sees them all inclined to worship, under all circumstances, and it draws the inference, that there is an innate disposition implanted in man, which impels him to worship superior beings ; it points to those who have this disposition most strongly marked, it shows that they have a remarkable development of a particular part of the brain, and it calls this part the organ by which the disposition manifests itself, or the organ of veneration. It then goes on to show, that, without this innate disposition, revelation would have been in vain ; and urges other considerations more familiar to you, Gentlemen, than to myself.

All phrenological writers, I believe, consider the organ of veneration to be well established : I do not doubt that it is so, but I should like to have security doubly sure ; and there seems to be here, in this country, an opportunity of making it so. There is every reason to suppose that the organ is increased by cultivation, or by the exercise of its function : it ought, then, to be much larger in the bigoted populations, who still bow with awe before the symbols of the cross, or the myrmidons of the Pope ; and smaller in the inhabitants of the United States. But, although no observations have yet been made, in regard to the operation of the organ among the inhabitants of this country, I think we may see evident marks of its existence, and even of its modification by circumstances. Here is nothing to bolster up and foster religion ; no political enforcements, no splendid pageants, no loss of *caste* from professing indifference, not even utter condemnation for acknowledged infidelity : it is not necessary here to feel or profess veneration, in order to secure the respect and admiration of the multitude, or to contract the most intimate social relations, or partake the sweetest endearments of the domestic circle, nor even to facilitate the acquisition of wealth. Nay ! it may stand in the way of this, which too many Americans consider as the first, last, and best gift of Heaven to man. Still, however, the faculty operates over this wide extended land ; still, at its bidding, hundreds of

thousands bend the daily knee; and still every Sabbath morn sees millions wending their voluntary way to answer its silent summons, and acknowledge its influence by prayer and praise.

But while we have this indisputable evidence of the workings of the faculty, do we not have all important ones of its modification by circumstances, exactly accordant with phrenological principles? The faculty is not highly cultivated, it is not pampered and forced, and not directed by political regulations: hence the difference between our religious rites and those of Catholic countries—hence the immense diversity of form. Veneration bids the people worship: but there is nothing to prescribe the manner, nothing to enforce a particular rite, and every one's veneration, modified by his moral idiosyncrasy, leads him to worship in his peculiar way.

Similar observations might be made upon various other mental dispositions, but time would fail me should I touch upon them. Permit me, however, ere I close, to put in a disclaimer upon some of the doctrines of Phrenology, and even the precepts of Spurzheim, who said, "that the wickedness of mankind and their disobedience to the peculiarly human nature, would continue as long as the brain were organized as it is now:" if this is the case, adieu to all hope of any material improvement of the race, for the organization of the brain *cannot* be changed by human means.

But is this the case? Are not individuals capable of great improvement? Are not societies and communities made up of individuals the same? and are not all the faculties educable? I cannot believe in the total depravity of man; and if there is any one thing which is certain to excite my disgust, it is the spirit of those who in one breath exalt, praise, and adore God, and in the next, insult Him by vilifying and degrading man, made in His own image.

There is no principle in human nature which forbids us to hope for a diminution of that undue influence of the animal propensities, which, though in themselves good, and good

as servants, are wretched masters, and lead to personal and public contentions—to rivalry, war, and crime. I cannot conceive that God has implanted in the breast of man those longings after improvement and perfection, those aspirations after early purity, which do exist there, and at the same time, fixed a barrier, beyond which he cannot go, long he never so much to go.

Reasoning *a priori*, I should say, that any such inference would be an imputation upon the justice of the Omnipotent; and, looking abroad on the world, I should say the inference was confirmed. I see among us, men, those whose examples and whose whole lives are as burning and shining lights, who are almost just men made perfect. Now only multiply such examples until they shall be common, until their light shall illumine, instead of merely making the surrounding darkness visible, and the change will be perceived. I do believe the tendency of the human race is onward, and toward good; I do believe that there is a struggle between the higher and nobler faculties peculiar to man and immortal beings, and those which he has in common with the brutes; and I cannot doubt the result of a struggle between such faculties. It is too much the fashion to ridicule the notion of the perfectibility of man—to scout the plans for advancing it, as visionary and utopian: but let no Phrenologist join in the hue and cry; for he would forswear some of the very fundamental principles of his science, he would suffer the noblest powers of man to lie still and rust, and he would attribute to the blessed Jesus words of bitter mockery; for he commanded that we should love our neighbor as ourselves; and that what we would have them do unto us, we should do unto them.

I know the difficulties are great, but I do not believe they are insuperable; and I do know that the energies of man have never yet been taxed to make the effort. Let the gigantic powers deputed to government be administered by men of moral greatness, by the moral giants of the earth, and direct-

ed to moral ends, and we should see great moral results. Was there ever a government upon the face of the earth administered strictly according to the dictates of the high moral principles of man's nature? Never—never! In ancient times the animal propensities were alone called upon to gain or exercise power; and in our better day, under our own comparatively glorious system, it is not much better. In the appeals to the people, in the treatment of other countries, is it benevolence, conscientiousness, and veneration,—or is it self-esteem, love of approbation, and combativeness, that are relied upon? What is national honor, according to the vocabulary of the modern politician? It is "to cry havock! and let slip the dogs of war;" it is to suffer want and misery at home; it is to spread misery and destruction and death abroad; it is to pillage, to burn, to murder; it is to violate every law of God; to outrage every nobler principle of man, rather than be rated by a false standard as a nation too meek to redress a wrong—a people too spiritless to resent an insult! It is to prefer the animal courage of the bull-dog and the tiger, to the moral courage of the philosopher and the Christian!

And what is the object of diplomacy—what are the questions discussed in the councils of those few who govern the masses of mankind? Is it how to benefit the whole race—how to develop the resources of the great earth—how to increase the accumulated capital of the world—how to enrich the frigid zones with the surplus of the tropics—how to reward industry and enterprise of one clime by freely exchanging its products for those of another? Alas! it is none of these; but a selfish and narrow policy, based upon the propensities, and lower sentiments, upon acquisitiveness, cautiousness, and self-esteem; and which seeks to keep up the partition walls between nations, and selfishly strives to increase the prosperity of one part of the great human family, at the expense of the prosperity of all the rest. Nay—these base principles are considered so essential to national prosperity, that he is looked upon as a puling moralist, an idle

visionary, who complains of their pernicious moral consequences.

The immense powers of government have never been exerted for other than immediate physical good; the lever of combined effort, acting on the fulcrum of common interest, has never been brought to bear fully upon moral ends! Our own age, indeed, begins to witness some such efforts; but how trifling, when compared with those directed to other objects, for instance, to commercial gain? Union is strength, shouts man; and straightway he unites with others into corporate bodies, which work the most wonderful changes in the form of matter: for instance, the delicate cotton plant, whose light down the wind of winter would scatter abroad, is made to assume new and strange forms; and man calls upon the earth, the air, fire, and water, to aid in his enterprise of converting it to his use. Nay, even the nobler elements themselves are seized and forced into his service; light is modified into a thousand colors, and the mysterious principle of magnetism is made to work an unpaid operative in the service of man. The simple plant is spread out into folds, which, united, would enwrap the great orbit of the globe itself; it assumes every variety of shape and texture which the wants or the whim of man suggest; he interlaces its fibres as lightly and cunningly as the web of the gossamer, or weaves them into a strong wing, which he flaps in the face of the baffled tempest, as he hurries in his flight across the ocean.

Men unite into companies, and, by their combined efforts, the hidden treasures of the earth are dragged up to light; the most distant parts of the globe are brought into communication—space seems almost annihilated—the mountains are bored—the valleys are filled up—the rivers are skipped over—and the great ocean itself becomes but a ferry.

Such are the effects of the energetic action of some of the inferior mental faculties: and why should not as great, and much greater ones, follow the same action of other and higher faculties, if seconded by the same stimulus? How little

is known of the moral world—of its extent, and its resources! How seldom is it considered, that the animal propensities, the selfish desires of man, may be made, and were doubtless by God intended to be made, subservient to great moral ends! For instance, there is one principle among a thousand others, which we might notice, but which is generally overlooked, viz. that beautiful and most benevolent provision in the moral statutes of the Lawgiver of the universe, that every virtuous action, every sacrifice upon the altar of general good, becomes a treasure profitably invested, yielding generous interest in all future time. Yes—disinterested actions are as beacons, which men can light up along their course of life; beacons, whose light is never extinguished, but which shed a benignant influence over the whole future: and happy is he, who, when the storms of adversity lower and darken his horizon, can look back through the dim vista of years, and see many of them burning in his pathway of the past.

This, and similar principles are to be explained and promulgated; and it can be done only by the united efforts of many. Leaving, then, to political governments the care of the physical world, let men unite in societies for exploring the resources of the moral world: there can be no nobler occupation than the search after truth—no safer conclusion than that it must be good when found. The pursuit may seem to be over dark and dangerous ground; doubt, infidelity, destruction of moral free agency, may appear like phantoms before us; but the ground seems dark only because unexplored, and the phantoms vanish when boldly approached.

It is childish to be deterred from the pursuit of truth by the fear of its consequences; it is absurd to urge as an argument against any science, that it may overthrow Christianity. If Christianity is false, then the sooner it is exploded the better. God is truth: and whatever else is truth must be good: but, thanks to Him! he has founded his religion in the eternal principles of nature. The study of those principles, then,

only confirm us in our religion, and encourage us to go on; and they have less faith in Christianity than we have, who fear to have it tested in any possible way.

Let men unite, then, for scientific research, fearless of its consequences. You, Gentlemen of the Phrenological Society, have thus associated yourselves; you have embarked together on the vast ocean of science, in search of the promised land of truth. Go on, then, undismayed by timid souls who cry, "The gulf of Atheism is ahead! the rocks of Materialism are around!" Such false alarms are as absurd as the fears of those who told Columbus he would come to the edge of the world, and sail off; and they must be treated as he treated them—for you have indications of land ahead, which are clearer, surer, than were his. Go on, then, Gentlemen; go on, strong in the eternal and immutable truth, that, *in this state of being*, there can be no operations or manifestations of mind, but through the agency of matter.

Here, then, is the clue to the dark and unexplained labyrinth of mind. Hold on to it—follow it up; organization, organization is every thing; this is the agency—this is the material, by which the Deity has chosen to operate; and by an examination of this agency, this material, you will arrive at a clearer insight into His works, and particularly into the noblest of them all,—MAN.

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